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Bringing the Economy Back In: Hannah Arendt,
Karl Marx, and the Politics of Capitalism
Onur Ulas Ince, Koç University
This article engages with the question of how to construct modern economic relations as an object of political theo-
rizing by placing Hannah Arendt’s and Karl Marx’s writings in critical conversation. I contend that the political aspect
of capitalism comes into sharpest relief less in relations of economic exploitation than in moments of expropriation that
produce and reproduce the conditions of capitalist accumulation. To develop a theoretical handle on expropriation and
thereby on the politics of capitalism, I syncretically draw on Marxian and Arendtian concepts by ﬁrst examining ex-
propriation through the Marxian analytic of “primitive accumulation of capital” and second delineating the political
agency behind primitive accumulation through the Arendtian notion of “power.” I substantiate these connections
around colonial histories of primitive accumulation wherein expropriation emerges as a terrain of political contestation.
From this perspective I conclude that such putatively “economic” questions as dispossession, exploitation, and accu-
mulation appear as irreducibly political questions.
This article engages with the question of how to con-struct modern economic relations as an object of po-litical theorizing by placing Hannah Arendt’s and
Karl Marx’s writings in conversation. I argue that Arendt’s
account of the “rise of the social,” when critically recon-
structed through the lens of Marx’s theory of the “primitive
accumulation of capital,” contributes to a political understand-
ing of capitalism by capturing the dimensions of power, ac-
tion, and violence constitutive of this economic system. The
political aspect of capitalism comes into sharpest relief, I
maintain, less in relations of economic exploitation than in
moments of expropriation that produce and reproduce the
conditions of capitalist exploitation and accumulation. A use-
ful theoretical handle on the element of expropriation, and
thereby on the politics of capitalism, can be crafted through a
syncretic adoption of Marxian and Arendtian concepts. I
contend that Marx’s notion of “primitive accumulation” en-
ables an analytic account of the coercive social transforma-
tions formative of capitalist relations, where Arendt’s heuristic
use of the term “expropriation” falls short of this task. At the
same time,Arendtiannotionsof “power” and“action”offer the
theoretical vocabulary necessary for delineating the politi-
cal agency behind primitive accumulation, which Marx’s
account fails to develop by reducing primitive accumulation
to an essentially economic process in the transition to cap-
italism. I conclude that a productive perspective on the
politics of capitalism can be crafted by recasting Arendt’s
notion of expropriation as primitive accumulation and reap-
praising primitive accumulation through the lens of power
and action.
This inquiry takes its originary cue from Arendt’s re-
ﬂections on the “social,” which constitutes the pivot of her
critique of capitalism and its detrimental impact on the
conditions of participatory politics, including the erosion of
stable political institutions, shrinkage of the public realm,
and the emergence of undifferentiated mass societies gov-
erned by bureaucratic technocracies. While these insights
have been welcomed by recent commentators as an op-
portunity for revitalizing democratic theory, Arendt’s con-
ceptual distinction between the “social” and the “political”
has found mixed reception. For the skeptics, this represents
a transhistorical and untenable distinction whereby the
social signiﬁes a speciﬁc domain centered on issues of ma-
terial reproduction that must be kept separate from a rar-
eﬁed sphere of politics reserved for speech, deliberation,
and judgment (Benhabib 1996; Bernstein 1986; Pitkin
1998).1 For the sympathetic interpreters, the social is a his-
torical category that encompasses the governmental dis-
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1. Seyla Benhabib perceives the social to be an index to Arendt’s “phenomenological essentialism,” while Hanna Pitkin interprets it as a mystiﬁed
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courses and biopolitical strategies regnant under capitalism,
which discloses the limits of subjecting socioeconomic con-
siderations to political judgment and action (Duarte 2007;
McClure 2007; Owens 2012a).
While Arendt’s ambivalent deployment of the term “so-
cial” warrants these contradictory readings,2 I maintain that
her discussion of the rise of the social, when understood in
historical terms, remains a valuable departure point for a
political understanding of capitalism for two reasons. First,
Arendt’s critique of the social squarely opposes the liberal
and Marxist employments of capitalism, as either the end
of history or a stage toward human emancipation, neither of
which opens to contestation a conception of historical prog-
ress predicated on material productivity and economic ex-
pansion (Rist 2009, 101–2).3 Arendt’s corollary objection tar-
gets the tendency to collapse politics into a conﬂict of “social
interests” over the management of economic growth, whether
this takes the form of trickle-down economics, welfarist re-
distribution, or collectivization of economic assets. Second,
Arendt’s conceptual elucidation on power and violence fur-
nishes crucial analytic categories for delineating the politi-
cal agency behind the actions and processes that have been
historically constitutive of capitalist relations of production,
even though, as I argue below, Arendt herself stops taking
this theoretical step. The radical contingency of Arendt’s no-
tion of “power” as the collective human agency capable of
inaugurating something new and unpredictable offers an al-
ternative way of thinking about the history of capitalism as
a long record of open-ended political struggles that cannot
be dissolved into prescripted historical narratives of human
improvement or class conﬂict.
Yet for this line of theorization to live up to its potential,
I contend that Arendt’s account of the rise of the social and
its conceptual cognate, the “social question,” needs to be
placed in critical dialogue with Marxian political economy
around the key concept of “expropriation” that Arendt (1958,
248) cites in the last chapter of The Human Condition among
the“great events [that] stand at the threshold of the modern
age.” With a few notable exceptions, this element has re-
ceived scant attention in recent literature on Arendt and
not without reason, since Arendt herself relegates expropria-
tion to a sideshow in her analysis of modern world alien-
ation, in which the center stage is claimed by modern natural
sciences.4 As Kirstie McClure (2007, 91) aptly notes, while
the “process of accumulation” and the corollary problem of
expropriation are “central element[s] in her account of the
emergence of ‘society,’” their development and ramiﬁcations
is “a story that Arendt does not really tell.” Similarly, Steven
Klein (2014, 857) submits that Arendt’s ambivalence toward
the modern welfare state principally stems from her “undif-
ferentiated and exaggerated understanding of expropriation.”
What gets lost in this conceptual inattention is the possi-
bility of thinking of expropriation as a terrain of political
struggle that has been historically resolved in favor of the
emergence and institutionalization of the social, understood
as a political-economic constellation composed of capitalist
relations of production and administrative state apparatuses
for promoting, directing, and managing them.
In order to recover and reconstruct this possibility, I
turn to Karl Marx’s notion of “ursprüngliche Akkumulation,”
rendered as the “primitive accumulation” or the “original ac-
cumulation” of capital, wherein one ﬁnds the most theo-
retically sophisticated explorations of the process of expro-
priation in the genealogy of capitalist modernity. Refracting
expropriation through the prism of primitive accumulation,
I contend, shines light on the elements of power, action,
and violence operative in historical processes of social trans-
formation constitutive of capitalism, and calls for rethink-
ing putatively “economic” questions, such as dispossession,
exploitation, and accumulation, in irreducibly political terms.
Constructing a political account of capitalism, while syn-
cretically drawing on Marx and Arendt’s insights, requires
arguing against both thinkers, who similarly tend to treat
expropriation as a process without political agency: Arendt,
by casting expropriation as an impersonal force of quasi-
elemental character that gives birth to the “society of la-
borers”; Marx, by specifying actors of expropriation but
subsuming their actions under the historical laws of mo-
tion of economic development, wherein violent expropri-
ation becomes the “midwife of history.”
In sketching this problematic, the article proceeds in
three sections. The ﬁrst section surveys and systematizes
Arendt’s remarks on expropriation, scattered across sev-
eral texts and two decades, triangulating the theoretical
coordinates of this element in her analysis of the birth of
capitalist modernity. The second section delves into Karl
Marx’s reﬂections on primitive accumulation, which Arendt
adopts through Luxemburg’s analysis of imperialism to sub-
stantiate her arguments about modern “worldlessness,” “pro-2. On Arendt’s ambivalent deployment of cardinal distinctions in The
Human Condition (1958), whereby she moves between “territorial” (di-
visive) and “relational” (connective) formulations, see Markell (2011).
3. A major inspiration for Arendt’s critique of the modern ideology of
progress is Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history. See especially “On
the Concept of History” (Benjamin 2006).
4. Important exceptions to this relative neglect are Klein (2014),
McClure (2007), and Owens (2011, 2012a).
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cess thinking,” and the bourgeoisie’s conﬂation of power and
violence. The third and ﬁnal section critically compounds
Marx and Luxemburg’s seminal arguments with recent co-
lonial historiographies of primitive accumulation to suggest
the centrality of expropriation to the consolidation of not only
capitalist relations but also ideological-institutional forms of
the nation-state in its postcolonial and settler-contract vari-
ants. This last section also highlights that expropriation is not
an amorphous historical force that “happens” to people but a
terrain of political contestation with concrete actors pursu-
ing contending societal visions, in which the very political-
economic conﬁguration of the social is at stake. I conclude
that a focus on the extra-economic and at times extra-legal
character of early-modern expropriation throws into relief
the political elements inscribed both at the origin and in the
logic of capitalism. Training the Arendtian concepts of power
and action on the genealogy of capitalism discloses the “po-
litical constitution of the social.”
The other underplayed element in Arendt’s story of
modernity, the “exploration” of the entire globe, remains
beyond the immediate purview of this article, although it
ﬁgures in this analysis when it interfaces with the problem
of expropriation and the rise of the social. Such interfaces
are thickest when the history of capitalism is cast as a global
rather than a European history, a move that represents a
corrective as much to Marx as to Arendt who both adopt a
Eurocentric framework of historical analysis. Overall, my
purpose in putting Arendtian and Marxian terms in con-
versation is neither to vindicate one against the other (Jay
1985; Pitkin 1998) nor to reconcile the two as essentially
congruent thinkers (Ring 1989). Rather, the ultimate pur-
pose of this essay is to develop a political perspective on
capitalism from the fragments extracted from Arendtian
and Marxian frameworks to suggest the inescapability of
thinking about economic questions as irreducibly political
questions.
EXPROPRIATION AS MODERN WORLD ALIENATION
The problem of forcible dispossession and dislocation, con-
ceptualized as “primitive accumulation” or “expropriation,”
forms a continuous if occasionally subterranean stream that
runs through Arendt’s works. The notion of expropriation
makes its debut in The Origins of Totalitarianism (Arendt
[1951] 1973) as part of the effort to understand the logic of
expansion that drives the nineteenth-century phenomenon
of imperialism.5 The operative term that Arendt uses here
is the “primitive accumulation of capital,” coined by Marx
([1867] 1976) in the last section of Capital, vol. 1. The for-
mative role of primitive accumulation in the history of cap-
italism is acknowledged in a passing remark as the process
“which gave birth to the bourgeoisie” and “changed the very
conception of property and wealth” (Arendt [1951] 1973,
145), preﬁguring some of Arendt’s reﬂections of expropria-
tion and worldlessness in The Human Condition. However,
at the center of her analysis is Luxemburg’s expanded treat-
ment of primitive accumulation as the means by which the
capitalist mode of production devours noncapitalist strata
and countries in order to reproduce itself, a process that
ﬁnds its most naked and violent forms in “colonial policy”
([1913] 2003, 328–47). “The original sin of simple robbery,”
Arendt writes, “which centuries ago made possible the ‘orig-
inal accumulation of capital’ (Marx) and had started all fur-
ther accumulation, had eventually to be repeated lest the
motor of accumulation suddenly die down” ([1951] 1973,
148).
The “original sin of simple robbery” invoked here refers
to Marx’s account of the forcible separation of the direct
producers from the means of production in late-medieval
and early-modern Europe, which gave rise to the institu-
tional conditions of the “capital-relation”: capitalist private
property, a mass of dispossessed wage laborers, and a com-
modity market in the means of subsistence ([1867] 1976,
875–76). Unlike Marx, Arendt does not pause to explore
the signiﬁcance of this originary dispossession for theoriz-
ing capitalism as a historical formation. While Arendt’s spe-
ciﬁc focus on totalitarianism rather than capitalism might
explain this inattention, as I elaborate below, this is an over-
sight that blocks from view certain political aspects of the
rise of the social.6 The cyclical recurrence of primitive ac-
cumulation as imperialist expansion represents for Arendt
the onslaught of capitalism as a worldless economic system
on the fragile political institutions of the world. It was this
structural imperative, she later adds, that impelled the po-
litical emancipation of the bourgeoisie and convinced this
class to “shake off the restraints of the Western tradition”
(Arendt [1951] 1973, 156). Locating the concrete mecha-
nism of this breakdown in the “alliance between capital and
5. Many of the key ideas in the Origins are preﬁgured in two essays
that Arendt published in 1946, where she engages with Marxian theories
of imperialism (1946a, 1946b). The concept of expropriation, however, is
missing in these writings. In a letter to Karl Jaspers in 1951, Arendt speaks
favorably of Marx’s essay, “Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood,”
which, by Marx’s own account, was an inspiration for his turn to political
economy (Arendt 1992, 167).
6. For a similar point, see Klein 2014. Klein’s direct focus on Arendt’s
understanding of expropriation is a welcome intervention. Nonetheless,
his own interpretation of expropriation entirely passes over its theoretical
antecedents in Karl Marx and Rosa Luxemburg and thereby misses some
of its crucial implications for thinking about capitalism and the social.
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the mob,” Arendt builds on Luxemburg’s thesis of over-
accumulation of capital for explicating the political conse-
quences of colonial policy.7 These include the proliferation
of unaccountable forms of power and means of violence in
imperial bureaucracies that then return to haunt European
metropoles, and the ominous symbiosis between the “un-
limited accumulation of capital” and the “unlimited accu-
mulation of power” that inundates the political principles
and institutions of the nation-state (143).8 As Karuna Man-
tena (2002, 88, 92) astutely observes, this represents a clas-
sical republican critique of empire in which “imperial des-
potism is seen to threaten and undo liberty at home,” revised
and updated by situating the drivers of despotism in mod-
ern phenomenon of expansion driven by the accumulation
of capital.
The point to emphasize here is that insofar as Arendt
grounds her analysis of imperialism on Luxemburg’s the-
ory of the accumulation of capital,9 she is effectively draw-
ing on a theory of primitive accumulation, the exact histor-
ical and theoretical coordinates of which she nonetheless
leaves unidentiﬁed. This inattention becomes all the more
important in the light of Margaret Canovan’s (1992, 19) ob-
servation that The Origins of Totalitarianism is “concerned
with imperialism rather than with Nazism as such,” and that
its driving concerns animate a host of connections and ten-
sions in Arendt’s later writings.10 One such connection be-
comes manifest in “Karl Marx and the Tradition of West-
ern Political Thought” (2002), the precursor to The Human
Condition, in which Arendt for the ﬁrst time traces the birth
of “modernity” to the historical elements of the emancipa-
tion of labor, the gloriﬁcation of violence as the “midwife
of history,” and the demand for universal freedom. At this
key juncture, primitive accumulation appears as the hinge
between the emancipation of labor and violence: “The de-
velopment of capitalism is essentially the consequence of
the violence of primitive accumulation” (Arendt 2002, 290).
Although Arendt once again eschews an explication of the
violence-capital nexus, her introduction of the “society of
laborers” as the speciﬁc mode of collective living under cap-
italism (311) suggests an afﬁnity with Marx and Luxemburg’s
understanding of primitive accumulation as the violent pro-
cess of dispossession that engenders relations of social re-
production centered on the activity of laboring. For as Arendt
herself makes clear, the gloriﬁcation of labor is not a theo-
retical invention of Marx; rather it is, in Benhabib’s words,
a “mentalité” corresponding to social conditions where the
majority of the people, having been deprived of direct ac-
cess to means of livelihood, have to sell their labor-power
for subsistence (1996, 139).
The same themes appear in The Human Condition
around the more thoroughly articulated problematic of
“modern world alienation.” This problematic constitutes
the book’s vanishing point, on which Arendt’s ruminations
on “labor,” “work,” and “action” converge. The ﬁrst thing
to note is the unequal emphasis allotted to the “three great
events” that collude in the “ﬂight from the world” and the
reversal of the traditional hierarchy within vita activa,
whereby “labor” is exalted into the deﬁning activity of hu-
man life at the expense of speech and action. As noted by
McClure, “in this account, the growth of modern sciences
takes pride of place,” while the exploration of the world and
the process of expropriation “recede from view” (2007, 19).
Likewise, Arendt’s scintillating exposition of the eidos of
animal laborans lacks a matching account of the concrete
historical developments that have led to its triumph, prompt-
ing John McGowan (1997a, 55) to conclude, “Arendt, in fact,
is neither very good at nor very interested in offering un-
derlying causes for the shift in the sensibility she describes.”
Corroborating these observations, Arendt ﬁrst attributes the
origins of world alienation to expropriation and accumu-
lation of wealth (1958, 257), only to explicitly dismiss the
latter’s importance a few pages later: “Compared with the
earth alienation underlying the whole development of nat-
ural science in the modern age, the withdrawal from ter-
restrial proximity contained in the discovery of the globe
as a whole and the world alienation produced in the two-
fold process of expropriation and wealth accumulation are
of minor signiﬁcance (264).”
The element of expropriation and accumulation, how-
ever, plays a more critical role in the book as a whole than
this passage suggests. An adequate reconstruction of this
role requires a focused survey of the earlier sections on prop-
erty, labor, and the rise of the social.
In The Human Condition, Arendt drops the term “orig-
inal accumulation” altogether, whose conceptual intension is
now borne by “expropriation.” Second, in many places she
substitutes “process of accumulation” for capitalism. This
7. This insight is borrowed almost ad verbatim from Luxemburg, who
writes, “On this self-contradictory basis it is no contradiction at all that
there should be an excess of capital simultaneously with an excess of
population” ([1913] 2003, 324).
8. For a series of essays that take their cue from Arendt’s examination
of the “boomerang effect” of imperialism, see King and Stone (2007).
9. Arendt ﬁnds in Luxemburg’s analysis a “brilliant insight into the
political structure of imperialism” ([1951] 1973, 148). The theoretical
inﬂuence of Luxemburg is further borne by Arendt’s praise of The Ac-
cumulation of Capital in “Rosa Luxemburg,” published in Men in Dark
Times (1970). Also see Young-Bruehl (1982).
10. In a letter to Karl Jaspers in 1947, Arendt wrote of Origins as her
“imperialism book” (1992, 68).
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vernacularization of essentially Marxian categories renders
them more congruent with Arendt’s peculiar critique of
capitalism, which heuristically relies on the spatial separa-
tion of the public and the private derived from her discussion
of democratic politics in the Greek polis (Villa 2000).11
Couched in terms of this spatial heuristics, the immediate
impact of expropriation appears as the destruction of the
common “world,” the only space in which human plurality
and uniqueness can be discovered and disclosed by speech
and action in the public realm. The possibility of the public
realm in turn rests on the availability of its constitutive op-
posite, a private space that gives human beings a stable
“location” in the world and “contains,” in the double sense of
the term, the economic activities of labor and consumption
associated with human life process. When Arendt speaks of
“private property” in The Human Condition, she refers to
this private space that simultaneously shelters human beings
from ruthless exposure to the public gaze and shields the
public space from the creeping inﬁltration of life processes
of labor and consumption (1958, 59–63). “Expropriation”
denotes the violent obliteration of the boundaries between
the public and the private that at once separate and connect
the two domains, the radical destabilization of the socio-
spatial markers it embodies,12 and (to use Polanyi’s [(1944)
2001] terms), the transmutation of one’s “habitation” in the
world into ﬂuid, exchangeable wealth, whereby “modern
property los[es] its worldly character”13 (Arendt 1958, 71).
With the loss of the steady opposition between the public
and the private, “the social” is born.
Expropriation also conceptually marks the “penetration
of the household (that is, economic and administrative)
concerns into public life” (Villa 2000, 10) where they are
subjected to governmental strategies that manage collec-
tive laboring activity and the material wellbeing of the pop-
ulation. This constitutes the threshold of the social, that
“curiously hybrid realm where private interests assume pub-
lic signiﬁcance” and “the fact of mutual dependence for the
sake of life and nothing else assumes public signiﬁcance”
(Arendt 1958, 35, 46).14 The conceptual twin of expropria-
tion is “appropriation,” which signiﬁes the drive to seize
the world, not in the form of “private property” as sketched
above but as “wealth” for the purpose of further accumu-
lation of wealth. In order for wealth to turn into “capital,”
however, it requires the “emancipation of labor,” which is
made possible by expropriation that releases “labor power
as the speciﬁcally human mode of the life force which is
as capable of creating a surplus as nature herself” (108).15
The “emancipation of labor is,” if not ironic, than certainly
a paradoxical term, for it achieves legal freedoms for the
laborer and tremendously accelerates the accumulation of
capital only by subjecting the mass of people to the im-
peratives of laboring for livelihood, thereby perpetually
binding the society of laborers to the realm of biological
necessity, to a condition of real unfreedom. Expropriation,
appropriation, and the emancipation of labor coalesce into
a processual dynamic of accumulation that unleashes the
“unnatural growth of the natural” (47) and degrades the
world into essentially a mass of consumer items produced
and devoured by the interminable and ever-expanding me-
tabolism of society (125–26).16
It is only in the light of these considerations that we can
appreciate the full import of Arendt’s historical equation of
the onset of the “modern age” with the “expropriation of
the poor” in a passage that is worth quoting at length:
The enormous and still proceeding accumulation of
wealth in modern society, which was started by ex-
propriation—the expropriation of the peasant classes
which in turn was the almost accidental consequence
of the expropriation of the Church and monastic prop-
erty after the Reformation—has never shown much
consideration for private property but has sacriﬁced
it whenever it came into conﬂict with the accumula-
11. This is not to suggest that Arendt adopts the Greek polis as a
template for modern politics. For an authoritative treatment of the place
of Ancient Greek politics in Arendt’s thinking, see Tsao (2002).
12. “Boundary” as a concept and as a spatial trope plays a crucial role
in Arendt’s thinking, principally by separating the human world from
nature and separating yet connecting the private and the public. Arendt
conceives of the political order (nomos) and institutions that make pos-
sible a distinctly human existence in terms of borders, “boundaries,”
“walls,” and “hedges” (1958, 59–61, 190–91).
13. For an instructive treatment of the twofold nature of property in
Arendt’s thought, as at once the realm of necessity and a “location with an
outer face,” see Klein (2014, 863), Markell (2011, 26–27). This reading also
registers an objection to Arendt’s understanding of property in classical
terms, as the condition of independence and leisure necessary for non-
domination. See Markell (2008).
14. For a comprehensive treatment of the “social” as the pivot of
Arendt’s historical analysis of capitalism and modern state administration,
see Owens (2012b).
15. On the signiﬁcance of labor’s capacity to create “surplus,” see
Terada (2011).
16. The cryptic term “unnatural growth of the natural” becomes in-
telligible if understood in terms of the purposiveness of fundamental
human activities. “Human condition restrains ownership to the actual
needs of life,” the satisfaction of which temporarily liberates human beings
from biological necessity and enables them to enter the public realm for
political deliberation (Arendt 1946a, 615). In a society of laborers, the
natural realm of necessity is unmoored from these purposive limits and
absorbs the entire body politic.
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tion of wealth. Proudhon’s dictum that property is
theft has a solid basis of truth in the origins of mod-
ern capitalism. . . . Individual appropriation of wealth
will in the long run respect private property no more
than the socialization of the accumulation process.
(Arendt 1958, 66–67)
As a boundary-destroying force, expropriation therefore
replaces the “permanence of the structure” of private prop-
erty with the “permanence of the process” of capital accu-
mulation, the subject of which is not individual property
owners but the “society” as a whole. With the “liberation of
the life process” (Arendt 1958, 47), the society of laborers
resembles less a distinctly human community of unique
individuals than “a society very similar to that of the ants and
bees” ([1951] 1973, 145).17 The governmental form corre-
sponding to this hive-minded, conformist, collective exis-
tence is the distinctly unpolitical ediﬁce of bureaucracy in
which “state and government gives place to pure adminis-
tration” (1958, 45).
With the exception of a passing remark on the role of
“expropriation by force” in the “early stages of capitalism,”
On Revolution (1962) is barren of any explicit mention of
expropriation, even though, as I argue at the end of this ar-
ticle, its theoretical implications insinuate themselves deeply
into the problematic of the “social question” to which Arendt
devotes one-third of the book. The subject resurfaces in an
interview published as “Thoughts on Politics and Revolu-
tion” in Crises of the Republic (1972). Asked to comment
on the Cold War alternatives of capitalism and socialism,
Arendt dismisses the difference between the rival systems
as spurious on the grounds that they share a fundamental ex-
propriatory logic. While capitalism “owed its start to a mon-
strous process of expropriation such as has never occurred
in history before,” “what has actually happened in Russia”
was simply the “process of expropriation [that] has been
carried further” (1972, 211–12).18 Based on this commonal-
ity, Arendt conjectures that perhaps “expropriation is in-
deed in the very nature of modern production,” a process
whose momentum can be arrested only by “legal and polit-
ical institutions that are independent of the economic forces
and their automatism” (212). Capitalism and socialism’s
shared comprehension of property as an instrument of pro-
duction in a system of socialized labor, rather than a pri-
vate place from which to enter the public realm, vitiates any
meaningful difference between the two systems, thus ren-
dering irrelevant, for Arendt’s purposes, the Marxian ques-
tion of class as predicated on the ownership of the means
of production. Instead, the solution that Arendt envisions
centers on a property-owning society to be achieved through
institutional arrangements that allow dispossessed masses to
“regain property” and reinstate the boundaries between po-
litical and economic processes.19
What calls for further elaboration is the theoretical sig-
niﬁcance of this Marxian notion that Arendt adopts through
Luxemburg, yet without explaining its analytic function. On
the one hand, expropriation appears as an essentially his-
torical element in “society’s victory in the modern age,”
whose story of “at least three centuries” Arendt narrates
(1958, 45). On the other hand, the process of world alien-
ation triggered by expropriation, while historically contingent,
is not a random chain of events; it has a deﬁnitive logic and
tendency to “assume even more radical proportions if it is
permitted to follow its inherent law” (1958, 257; emphases
added). As I elaborate in the next two sections, the ambi-
guity of these passages can be clariﬁed by identifying the
elements of “power” and “action” behind historical processes
of expropriation that set in motion the accumulation of
capital and associated governmental forms that, once insti-
tutionalized, assume the semblance of an autonomous, im-
personal, unstoppable “force,” akin to natural laws or laws
of history. It is the ideological sway of this semblance that
underpins liberal and Marxian faith in progress as the lib-
eration of productive forces of society, from which, for all
her skepticism, Arendt’s own reﬂections on the rise of the
social are not exempt. In order to apprehend the political
constitution of the social that eludes Marx and Arendt alike,
we need to delve deeper into primitive accumulation and the
element of power driving it.
EXPROPRIATION AS PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION
As mentioned above, Arendt dates the great event of ex-
propriation back to the aftermath of the Reformation and
the “earlier stages of capitalism.” Likewise, in her discussion
17. The choice of metaphor is not accidental. In eighteenth-century
political and economic thought, the nonhuman sociability of “ants” and
“bees” was often invoked to convey the spontaneous harmony of the
market-cum-civil society, which emphatically excluded political deliber-
ation, judgment, or decision.
18. There is more than mere imagistic analogy here, since the policy
identiﬁed by Arendt was self-consciously and self-righteously labeled
“socialist primitive accumulation” by Yevgeni Preobrazhensky in the mid-
1920s and implemented by Joseph Stalin in the 1930s with a cruelty that
could be sanctioned only by the “faith in history and its bloody and
grandiose demands” (Arendt 1994, 278).
19. Arendt’s call to cordon off politics from economic processes,
paralleled by her prescription of the “social issues” to the expertise of
specialized administrators, has raised a red ﬂag for recent interpreters. For
particularly sharp frontal criticisms, see Pitkin (1981) and Leonard (1997).
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of the French Revolution, we ﬁnd the acknowledgment that
“social and economic matters had intruded into the public
realm before the revolutions of the late eighteenth century,”
and “the transformation of government into administra-
tion” had already become a “characteristic of absolutism”
(1962, 91).20 What is left unexplained, as Pitkin notes, is
“how capital accumulation, a rule-governed elite, and des-
potic monarchy are related and form aspects of the social
at this stage” (1998, 15). To address this question, we revisit
Marx’s investigation of the early-modern conﬁguration of
primitive accumulation and state power in Europe, as this
account, expanded by Luxemburg’s analysis of imperialism,
furnishes the theoretical armature of Arendt’s thinking on
expropriation and capitalism.
The last part of Capital, vol. 1, titled “The So-Called
Primitive Accumulation,” is an inquiry into the historical
origins of the capitalist mode of production, congruent with
the volume’s overall purpose of historicizing the allegedly
universal categories of classical political economy.21 Marx
begins by pillorying Adam Smith’s projection of the fru-
gality of the modern capitalist back into time immemorial
as the basis of the “original accumulation” of capital. Against
such “insipid childishness,” Marx offers an account of the
historical role of “violence” in the destruction of noncapi-
talist forms of social reproduction and their reconstitution
along capitalist lines. Written in letters of “blood and ﬁre,”
the story of primitive accumulation begins with the expro-
priation of the agricultural producers, epitomized by the
English Enclosures and Highland Clearances. It continues
with the brutal repression of the dispossessed under maxi-
mum wage laws and the “bloody legislation” that crimi-
nalize vagrancy and vagabondage under the penalty of muti-
lation, forced labor, and transportation. At home, it includes
protectionism, overtaxation, and national debt as instru-
ments of public dispossession and private concentration of
capital.22 In the colonies, it assumes global proportions with
the Atlantic slave economy and the plunder of South and
Southeast Asia (Marx [1867] 1976, 873–913). In their ca-
pacity of annihilating traditional social structures and clear-
ing the path for capitalist relations, these moments of prim-
itive accumulation constitute the “prehistory” of capitalism.
Foregrounding the essentially coercive character of these
processes, Marx notes “in actual history, it is a notorious fact
that conquest, enslavement, robbery, and murder, in short,
force play the greatest part,” a note that reaches a crescendo
when he adds, “These methods . . . all employ the power of
the state, the concentrated and organized force of society,
to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation of
the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, to
shorten the transition. Force is the midwife of every society
which is pregnant with a new one” (915–16).
In order to appraise the signiﬁcance of this last sen-
tence for the politics of capitalism, we need to take a detour
through Arendt’s conceptual distinctions between “power,”
“violence,” and “force,” broached in “On Violence.” For
Arendt, “force” is characteristically impersonal and objec-
tive, be it the “forces of nature” or the “force of circum-
stance” (1972, 144). It impresses itself on human beings
in the form of an elemental “necessity” beyond human con-
trol such as the imperatives of biological survival. “Vio-
lence,” on the other hand, is distinguished by its strict in-
strumentality as the mediating term in the relations that
human beings enter with the world and with one another
(145). It acquires its meaning only in its exercise to es-
tablish the human subject’s sovereignty over the world of
objects and other human beings, most importantly, for
mastering the force of necessity by appropriating nature
or commanding the labor of others (Arendt 1958, 114).
“Power” stands in stark contrast to both force and violence.
Unlike “force,” which is experienced as external to human
agency, power is subjective and encapsulates that unique
“human ability not just to act but to act in concert” (1972,
143). Unlike violence, which is manifested in the subject-
object relationship, it is irreducibly intersubjective and non-
instrumental. It can emerge only when a plurality of human
beings acts together for a shared purpose, yet this very plu-
rality renders the results of such action unpredictable and
capable of bringing into world something truly new that
deﬁes the sovereign pretensions to domination and control
inherent in instrumental relations.
20. Here I broadly follow McClure and Owens’s strictly historical
understanding of and analytic distinction between the “rise of the social”
and the “social question.” The “social” denotes the broader interface be-
tween the historical development of capitalist social forms and the con-
comitant invention of administrative state apparatuses for managing
them. The “social question” emerges as the context-speciﬁc problems or
crises that erupt in this interaction, be it the seventeenth-century problem
of vagabondage incited by the English Enclosures or the nineteenth-
century question of how to integrate the industrial laboring class to extant
political institutions (McClure 2007, 89, 101; Owens 2011 17–20). A much
more precise intellectual history of the merger of statecraft and economic
management is to be found in Hont (2005).
21. For Marx as for Arendt, political economy represents a historically
speciﬁc ﬁeld of knowledge, analysis, and policy devised to comprehend the
novel social reality of an independent economic domain originating in
eighteenth-century Europe.
22. In “Thoughts on Politics and Revolution,” Arendt also categorizes
similar policies as an ongoing and “mild form of expropriation” (1972,
212).
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Viewed through this conceptual framework, Marx’s des-
ignation of violence as the midwife of history imagines
history as a “process,” the agents of which are no longer
“men” in their plurality of intentions and concerted ac-
tion but “mankind” as an undifferentiated, uniﬁed subject.
Arendt partially exculpates Marx by adding that his exal-
tation of the realm of necessity as “gloriﬁcation of mute
violence” and “gloriﬁcation of labor” is mainly an index to
the factual transformation of social relations that heralds
the dawn of modernity (2002, 291, 294). Marx inherits and
casts in dialectical mold the bourgeois faith in the inevi-
tability of progress, evinced in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century theories of sociohistorical evolution, from the
“primitive” to the “civilized” society through the transfor-
mative violence of primitive accumulation. For Arendt, the
real problem with Marx is, in Waseem Yaqoob’s (2014,
404) words, his “indiscriminate reconciliation” to this vi-
olence that is rooted in a Hegelian faith in history, whereby
primitive accumulation is accorded the world-historical
role of universalizing and consummating the contradictions
of capitalism as the necessary condition of its dissolution.
Under the acerbic tone of Marx’s account of primitive ac-
cumulation, Arendt discerns a dangerous acquiescence to
violence as the mediating element that miraculously trans-
mutes the compulsion to labor under the force of necessity
(alienated labor) into its opposite, universal freedom and
equality.23
Yet in spite of her incisive criticism of Marx’s confusion
of power and violence and his reduction of both to an in-
strument of the forces of historical laws, Arendt falls into a
similar position when she hypostatizes “the social” as an
impersonal force that has “transformed all modern com-
munities into societies of laborers and jobholders” (1958,
46). Behind this hypostatization is Arendt’s subtle parsing
out of the political and the social on the basis of the dis-
tinction between power and force. “All political institu-
tions,” Arendt writes, “are manifestations and materiali-
zations of power,” and they rest on the “continuation of the
consent that brought the laws into existence in the ﬁrst
place” (1972, 140, emphasis added). In contrast to her pred-
ication of the political on action that instantiates power,
she consigns the social to the realm of force as the “energy
released by physical or social movements” (144, emphasis
added). Underpinning Arendt’s equation of the social and
the natural is her understanding of the former as partaking
in the same blind automatism as the laws of nature. This
leads her to a ﬁxation, in Klein’s words, on the “process
character of expropriation at the expense of the web of human
relationships that sustains it” (2014, 10).
Arendt writes that “nothing . . . is more common than
the combination of violence and power” (1972, 145–46),
and to point out the political element of power behind the
violence of expropriation, we ought to examine the formal
theory of primitive accumulation that is interlaced with
Marx’s story of capital’s origins.24 True to his relational con-
ceptualization of capital, Marx deﬁnes primitive accumu-
lation not as the accumulation of material wealth but as the
process that creates the “capital-relation” between, on the
one hand, privately owned means of production and sub-
sistence, and on the other, dispossessed and legally free labor.
At the outset of his discussion of primitive accumulation,
Marx identiﬁes the concept as “the process which divorces
the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own
labor . . . whereby the social means of subsistence and pro-
duction are turned into capital, and the immediate produc-
ers are turned into wage-labourers” ([1867] 1976, 874).25 The
signiﬁcance of this deﬁnition is threefold. First, in contrast
to Arendt’s rendering of this narrative, where she casts “the
social” as an impersonal historical force that effects capi-
talist transformation, Marx’s conceptualization allows for
identifying historically speciﬁc contexts, actors, and processes
through which labor is “emancipated” and human beings
are reduced to bearers of labor-power.26 A political render-
ing of this account a la Arendt, however, requires readingMarx
against Marx by unmooring these actors and processes from
his historicist employment in which they fade into scripted
performances in the grand world-historical drama of the
“rise of capitalism.” A similar ambivalence attends Marx’s
23. This remains a trenchant critique, a sort that Marx himself had to
confront toward the end of his life. His ethnographic notebooks and
Russian letters betray a profound reconsideration of the linear historicism
implicit in his earlier accounts, as well as reﬂections on alternative paths to
socialism that are not necessarily mediated by the violence of primitive
accumulation. See Anderson (2010) and Shanin (1983).
24. Primitive accumulation as a concept is not without controversy,
which has found renewed vigor after David Harvey’s (2003) resuscitation
of the term in the form of “accumulation by dispossession.” For excellent
overviews of the twentieth-century debates, see de Angelis (2004); Sanyal
(2007). For a recent survey of the extant literature and a theoretical re-
appraisal, see Ince (2014).
25. In the same section, Marx introduces a tremendously helpful
distinction between capitalist private property and individual private
property, which captures and clariﬁes the essence of the distinction
Arendt draws between property and wealth ([1867] 1976, 889).
26. Arendt does identify a number of historical actors in the Origins of
Totalitarianism, such as the bourgeoisie, the mob, and the imperial bu-
reaucracy. However, these actors are post-factum creatures of capitalist
relations who further the expansionary and essentially nonpolitical dy-
namic of capital accumulation. In the place of the origins of capitalist
relations and the particular human agency therein, we encounter a gaping
hole, which is later ﬁlled by the amorphous notion of the “social” in the
Human Condition.
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view of the violence operative in expropriation. Marx ges-
tures at a political conception of expropriation when he states
that primitive accumulation depends on the “concentrated
and organized force of society,” signaling and opening up
a space in which Arendt’s notions of power and action can
gain theoretical traction. Unfortunately, he quickly forecloses
this potential by adding that this force “is itself an economic
power” that “hasten[s], as in a hothouse, the process of trans-
formation from the feudal mode of production to the cap-
italist mode” (915–16). Nonetheless, as I discuss in the next
section, when disentangled from its historicism and econ-
omism, Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation has much
to offer for politicizing the social by highlighting the dimen-
sion of power behind the violence of expropriation constitu-
tive of capitalism.
Second, Marx’s theoretical construction of primitive accu-
mulation inscribes it in the very core of the capital-relation,
which “not only maintains this separation [between the
workers and the conditions of labor], but reproduces it on
an ever expanding scale” (874). To the extent that workers
acquiesce in the requirements of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction as self-evident economic laws, extra-economic co-
ercion yields to the “silent compulsion” of the economy and
the workings of the invisible hand of the market. In other
words, Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation offers a han-
dle on the institutionalization of expropriation in the society
of laborers,27 whereby, to use Arendtian terms, the “force”
of biological necessity rules after the “violence” of direct ex-
propriation recedes. Third and by extension, by anchoring
the “victory of animal laborans” in concrete mechanisms that
give rise to the “society of laborers,” Marx’s theory casts into
relief the structural conditions that enable, if not dictate, the
“purely social perspective” through which all human activity
is understood in terms of “making a living” (Arendt 1958,
88, 127).
The crucial implication of these observations is that, when
viewed through the lens of primitive accumulation, “the so-
cial” ceases to be an experiential category, the expression of
the laboring mentalité bursting the conﬁnes of the private
and inﬁltrating the public realm. It reappears as a histori-
cally speciﬁc network of concrete social relationships that
hinge on the compulsory mediation of access to means of
livelihood by the imperative to generate a surplus for capital
accumulation. Whether this compulsion materializes in brute
violence or strategic instrumentalization of necessity, it har-
bors a political dimension of constituent power, as I elabo-
rate in the next section.28
One critical attempt to overcome the historicism that
structures Marx’s story of transition to capitalism is sup-
plied by Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital ([1913]
2003), which renders it more congruent with Arendt’s re-
ﬂections on expropriation. While Marx provides the theo-
retical framework for capturing violent expropriations con-
stitutive of the capital-relation and its institutionalization
under the economic coercion of wage labor, Luxemburg’s
study forcefully argues that the originary violence of primi-
tive accumulation can never be dispensed with even after
the capitalist mode of production stands on its own two
feet. Despite Arendt’s doubt that Luxemburg “was a Marxist
at all” (1970, 38), Luxemburg clearly adhered to Marx’s cat-
egories in her historical analysis of capitalism as a contra-
dictory social formation.29 Speciﬁcally, her examination of
modern imperialism builds on Marx’s theory of primitive
accumulation and works through some of the major im-
passes afﬂicting the latter. At the core of Luxemburg’s anal-
ysis is the thesis that capitalism as an economic system can-
not autonomously reproduce itself but has to rely on renewed
processes of primitive accumulation.30 In contrast to Marx’s
historicist understanding of primitive accumulation as a phase
that is left behind by the advent of the “expanded repro-
duction” of capital, Luxemburg conceives of the continuous
expropriation of noncapitalist social strata and countries as
endemic to capital’s life process. Here we ﬁnd an unambig-
uous line of theoretical continuity between Luxemburg’s in-
sight and Arendt’s conjecture that “expropriation is indeed
in the very nature of modern production” (1972, 212).
By extension, Luxemburg unshackles the violence of
expropriation from its early-modern moorings and renders
it coterminous with the history of capital as whole. “Force
is the only solution open to capital; the accumulation of cap-
ital, seen as an historical process, employs force as a per-
manent weapon not only at its genesis, but further on down
27. Arendt obliquely gestures at the institutionalization of expropri-
ation in her discussion of “bourgeois philosophy” in relation to Hobbes.
The key element here is the designation of private property and its ac-
cumulation as a public concern (Arendt 1946a, 609–14; 1946b, 6–7).
28. By “strategic instrumentalization of necessity,” I mean the con-
sciously devised methods to mobilize economic need to compel people to
labor. Such thinking dates at least back to the seventeenth-century, when
the laboring poor was perceived by statesmen and pamphleteers to be
“idle, surly, and unwilling to work ‘if two days pay will keep them a
week.’ ” The proposed solution was to reduce average wages through
maximum wage legislation to compel laborers to work (Appleby 1978,
145–46).
29. Arendt’s effort to salvage Luxemburg from Marxism is in tune
with her more general disposition for “breaking with class analyses while
retaining a Marxist emphasis on imperialism” (Yaqoob 2014, 401).
30. Luxemburg’s core theoretical tenet is “the realization of surplus
value for the purposes of accumulation is an impossible task for a society
which consists solely of workers and capitalists” ([1913] 2003, 330).
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to the present day” ([1913] 2003, 351). In Europe and the
United States, the vectors of expropriation instantiate in rev-
olutions, wars, and coercive taxation; elsewhere, they as-
sume the form of “colonial policy,” ranging from robbing
rural communities of their land to instituting brutal regimes
of bonded labor. The unifying logic behind the variegated
methods of expropriation is the eradication of noncapital-
istic forms of social reproduction, such as “natural econ-
omy,” “peasant economy,” and “simple commodity produc-
tion,” in order to release the means of production and labor
power in which capital ﬁnds room for self-expansion. Ex-
pressed in starker terms, primitive accumulation in Lux-
emburg’s account represents the violent drive of capital to
transform the entire population of the world into a “society
of laborers” by deepening the capital-relation in the in-
dustrial metropoles and, as imperialism, absorbing produc-
tive practices across the globe into planetary circuits of cap-
ital accumulation.
Two important conclusions follow from the preceding
analysis. First, when situated in imperialism and colonial
policy, primitive accumulation illuminates the conﬂation of
power and violence that for Arendt deﬁnes the bourgeois
conception of politics. The liberation of productive forces
and economic growth deﬁne the bourgeoisie’s social func-
tion and historical mission. The “political emancipation”
of this class through imperialism, in which the economic
principle of ceaseless expansion is elevated to a political ob-
jective, leads to the collapsing of politics into the project
of violently demolishing noncapitalist social forms and re-
constituting them in the service of capital accumulation on
a global scale. The second and related conclusion is that
Arendt’s notion of “mankind” is less bound up with the
universal viewpoint of natural sciences that looks down to
the earth from the space and perceives humanity as yet an-
other biological species that inhabits the planet. Rather,
“mankind,” understood as an undifferentiated whole whose
common denominator is the laboring process (Arendt 1958,
256), ﬁnds the conditions of its historical reality in global
processes of primitive accumulation that are coeval with the
history of capital. Accordingly, expropriation as primitive
accumulation pushes Arendt’s account of the rise of the so-
cial beyond the unit of the nation-state and opens up a his-
torical vista of colonial empires in which to situate not just
world alienation but, more importantly, world destruction.
This last element has been a source of insight in recent
investigations of the entangled genealogies of capitalism, Eu-
ropean imperialism, and postcolonial polities, which push
beyond Marx’s historicism and Arendt’s undifferentiated
treatment of expropriation. Placing expropriation in colo-
nial perspective reveals its stakes to be not just capitalist
transformation but a broader reconﬁguration of political
institutions through which material and social reproduction
is regulated. Second, it shows that such transformation is
not a unilateral process that rolls over its victims who pas-
sively suffer it, but a political terrain punctuated by resis-
tance to expropriation and contestation over its vectors and
limits. The next section investigates these themes around re-
cent scholarship on the postcolonial nation-state, the settler-
contract, and early-modern class struggle.
EXPROPRIATION AS A POLITICAL TERRAIN
That primitive accumulation is not merely an economic
phenomenon can be illustrated by an examination of the
developmental nation-state that emerged as the institutional
heir to European colonial empires in the aftermath of the
Second World War. Recent postcolonial scholarship has per-
suasively argued that the developmental state effectively took
over the mandate of the colonizing powers to develop the
economic resources of colonial territories through direct and
indirect expropriatory policies (Anghie 2005; Pahuja 2011).
Yet the continuity in economic policy is only half of the
story. Perhaps more fundamental is the inheritance from
colonial empires of a vision of progress understood as the
construction of a politico-legal order comprising a civil soci-
ety of rights-bearing citizens and a representative govern-
ment embodied in the nation-state. In a path-breaking study,
Partha Chatterjee (1993; also see Chatterjee 2011) argues that
these political indicators of “development” are embedded in
a broader history of capital in which primitive accumulation
plays a pivotal role. Primitive accumulation in Chatterjee’s
account represents “nothing but the destruction of precap-
italist community, which, in various forms, had regulated
the social unity of laborers with their means of production”
(235). Emplotted in the narrative of capitalist modernity, the
community “becomes relegated to [capital’s] prehistory, a
natural, prepolitical, primordial stage in social evolution that
must be superseded for the journey of freedom and progress
to begin. And since the story of capital is universal, com-
munity, too becomes the universal prehistory of progress,
identiﬁed with medievalism in Europe and the stagnant,
backward, undeveloped present in the rest of the world”
(Chatterjee 1993, 235).
Chatterjee’s observation distills the essence of the post-
war “modernization theory” that held responsible for the
poverty of the “underdeveloped” nations the stasis of their
“traditional” social structures. The corollary prescription was
a comprehensive reconstruction of these societies along the
lines of Occidental rationality that would render their po-
litical institutions congruent with a capitalist economy (Peet
and Hartwick 2009). Expressed in Arendtian terms, this
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amounted to the active institution of the “social.” Seen in
the light of the radical aspirations of modernization, primi-
tive accumulation appears as a political project that breaks
down the governmental structures of the noncapitalist com-
munity, and gives rise to, on the one hand, the individual
citizen of subjective rights, and on the other, the nation as
“the only legitimate community in modern society, a role
that must then be enforced by the disciplinary mechanisms
of the nation-state” (Chatterjee 1993, 234). In other words,
primitive accumulation belongs as much to the history of
“le citoyen” (notwithstanding the older tradition behind this
ﬁgure) as of “le bourgeois” (McGowan 1997a, 90).
The cautionary conclusion of this brief discussion is the
danger of collapsing the understanding of “politics proper”
to the Western nation-state form, which effaces the prac-
tices of collective self-government in noncapitalist com-
munities that extend to the management of the means of
production and subsistence. This is a juncture where we
have to part ways with Arendt. While Arendt cannot be
held accountable for exhausting the concept of the political
in the modern nation-state form, she does stand susceptible
to the charge of predicating the contours of the political too
intimately on the Western experience and acknowledg-
ing as properly political only those revolutions and rare
moments of the labor movement that belong to the Euro-
American history (1962, 216–19).31 For instance, she has no
qualms about speaking of “nonpolitical communities” un-
der “oriental despotism,” whose public sphere is not the
agora or the assembly but an “assemblage of shops” (1958,
160).32 To follow Chatterjee’s cue, non-Western commu-
nities ﬁnd their place alongside the feudal household that
for Arendt is barren of a public space and therefore of
the conditions of politics. Their forms of collective self-
government thereby suffer a double exclusion from the
domain of the political, whether it is understood as speech
and action among peers or as the nominal membership in
the body politic of the modern nation. Through a peculiar
inversion of the eighteenth-century European image of the
“Orient” as “all state and no society,” Arendt depicts the
same as “all society, no politics.”
When we shift our focus from imperial dependencies
like India to settler colonies in America, we encounter an
even more striking instance of the imbrication of expro-
priation and the establishment of political institutions that
is pivotal to Arendt’s ideas on revolutionary founding and
constitutionalism. Arendt famously celebrates the “coloni-
zation of North America and the republican government of
the United States,” as “perhaps the greatest, certainly the
boldest enterprises of European mankind” (1962, 55). For
Arendt, one of the most commendable feats of the Amer-
ican Revolution was its exclusion of the “social question” of
mass poverty from the purview of founding a new polity.
Unlike the French Revolution, where the issue of the ma-
terial well-being of the populace overﬂowed the conﬁnes
of state “policy” and came to be embodied in “the people”
(1962, 60; McClure 2007, 87), the American Revolution suc-
ceeded in bracketing economic questions. This was thanks
to a unique blessing of colonial America, namely, the ab-
sence of misery and wretchedness, which emblazoned it in
the European imagination as the ﬁrst “society without pov-
erty” (1962, 22).
What has been lost on Arendt and contemporary com-
mentators alike in the American case is the fact of native
dispossession that underpinned the felicitous absence of
poverty in colonial America, which tightly weaves together
the violence of expropriation and revolutionary politics.
Arendt does concede that America had a variant of the social
question in the form of African slavery (1972, 71–72), the
resolution of which through the American Civil War in-
volved violence on a scale larger than the Terror (Benhabib
1996, 160–61). In “Civil Disobedience,” she approvingly
refers to Alexis de Tocqueville’s prescience in diagnosing the
United States’ future bane to be the exclusion of “Negros”
and “Indians” from the “original consensus universalis of the
American republic” (Arendt 1972, 90). In the rest of Arendt’s
essay, however, “Indians” entirely disappear from the view,
and the discussion is engulfed by the Negro question.33 Nor
is this the ﬁrst or the only time Arendt ignores the native
peoples of what would become Anglophone settler colonies.
In the Origins, for instance, she writes “Canada and Aus-
tralia were almost empty and had no serious population
problem” ([1951] 1973, 182). Therefore, Arendt (like Marx
31. Arendt’s Eurocentrism has been noted by several scholars. Yaqoob
writes, “Arendt’s account of imperialism, while avowedly anti-colonial,
was strongly Eurocentric” (2014, 391), while Mantena notes that for
Arendt “ imperialism appears only as an episode of and for European
history” (2002, 103 ). Robert Bernasconi (2007) carries this critique fur-
ther, contending that Arendt was not only Eurocentric, but she also ac-
tively struggled to safeguard the “Western tradition” from being blem-
ished by Western imperialism. For a critical exchange, see Gundogdu
(2011) and Klausen (2011).
32. To take this a step further, in a tragic inversion of triumphalist
narratives of modernity, the “nonpolitical community” of the Orientals ar-
guably furnishes the image that captures the deterioration of politics in the
West: the modern market as the new, unpolitical public space, which is
presided over by modern bureaucracy that mirrors Oriental despotism in
its unaccountability.
33. This is notwithstanding that her source of inspiration, Tocqueville
himself, devotes roughly equal space in Democracy in America to the dis-
cussion of Native Americans and African slaves.
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before her)34 squarely looks past the indigenous inhabi-
tants of the continent, whose expropriation supplied the
colonial settlers with the possibility of becoming Benjamin
Franklin’s cherished “freeholders” (1962, 67).
This question is investigated in an excellent recent study
by Aziz Rana (2010), who demonstrates the historical link
between, on the one hand, the “settler liberty” undergirding
the republican form of government in the United States
and, on the other, landed property that was made available
to white settlers through an essentially imperial process of
territorial conquest, complete with a legal nomenclature
and a discourse of civilization and savagery inherited from
the British imperial tradition. American people were ex-
empt from the dehumanizing need that blighted the French
masses on the eve of the Revolution, because they held prop-
erty, however modest; and they held property because they
had expropriated the indigenous peoples. From this angle, the
eventual intrusion of the social question into American pol-
itics in the late-nineteenth century was due as much to the
closing down of the frontier and unavailability of land as
to the “onslaught of urbanization, industrialization, and . . .
mass migration” (Arendt 1962, 55).35
Settlerism, like developmentalism, thus brings into view
the interlinked cascades of capitalist expropriation in Eu-
rope and (post)colonial expropriation elsewhere. Once con-
ceived globally, the implications of expropriation extend
beyond the rise of the social and into questions of politi-
cal agency and state-formation. Under the disturbing light
shone by native dispossession, the American political ex-
periment, which Arendt describes as the closest concrete
approximation to the “social contract idea” (2002, 288),
appears as what Carol Pateman (2007) has labeled a “settler
contract”—a contract that founds a new polity on the ruins
of another. If “everything depends on the power behind the
violence” (Arendt 1972, 148), then the element of “power”
emanating from the colonial settlers’ concerted action con-
versely depends on the violent expropriation of the indigenous
peoples. A strict Arendtian interpretation might dismiss this
criticism on the grounds that native dispossession belongs
strictly to the economic side of the Revolution (i.e., to the
tragic inevitability of the mastery of necessity through vio-
lence, be it through enslavement or expropriation) and is
therefore nonpolitical (Arendt 1958, 114). However, the vi-
olence at work in this case, as well as the concerted action
that underwrites it, are not only squarely outside the house-
hold, which renders them public, but they also proceed
through the not-unselfconscious obliteration of other hu-
man communities and their forms of self-government.36 The
element of power that makes such destructive expropriation
practicable is not conceptually far from the “organized soli-
darity of the masters” over the slaves in the ancient polis,
wherein Arendt observes that “a superior organization of
power” is inﬁnitely more important than “superior means
of coercion” (1972, 148–49).
Viewed through the same lens, the concerted action be-
hind the violence operative in indigenous dispossession ap-
pears not too distant from the organized solidarity of the
improving landlords, merchants, and manufacturers behind
the Glorious Revolution, whose ideological and institutional
innovations propelled the great expropriation of the English
Enclosures forward.37 And not unlike the Glorious Revolu-
tion and the eventual legalization through “Parliamentary En-
closures” of the once-unlawful expropriation of the English
peasantry, the American Revolution weds political power and
action to the violence of expropriation. Arendt admits that
power and violence are often found entwined yet concludes,
“from this, it does not follow that authority, power, and vi-
olence are all the same” (1972, 145–46). While “power” and
“violence” might be categorically distinct, expropriation, par-
ticularly when placed in the context of settler colonialism,
represents a peculiar case in which the two bend into each
other like a Möbius strip. Expropriation and exploration,
the two events downplayed in Arendt’s story of modernity,
return to merge in colonial America. What spells the onset
of modern world alienation for Europe and its settler colo-
nial offshoots, portends world destruction, or in James Tully’s
34. See Marx ([1867] 1976, 934), where he speaks of colonial land as
freely available “public property.”
35. In a similar vein, the failure of mass poverty in nineteenth-century
Britain to translate into an explosive social question arguably owes to
massive emigration to Britain’s settler colonies starting in the 1840s. Once
the prospects of giving land to the dispossessed of Europe by dispossessing
non-Europeans wane, the problem of “surplus population” or “superﬂu-
ous men” reasserts itself as a “social question,” the management of which
now requires other policy measures ranging from welfare to workfare to
mass incarceration. See Braun (2007), Duarte (2007), and Sanyal (2007).
36. Admitting the tragic necessity of such collective expropriation
would bring Arendt too close to Carl Schmitt to be tenable. For his po-
sition on colonial land appropriation, see Schmitt ([1950] 2003), 349.
37. For an authoritative investigation of the political economy of the
Glorious Revolution, see Pincus (2009). Arendt makes an oblique refer-
ence to this alliance when she writes, “Society, when it ﬁrst entered the
public realm, assumed the disguise of an organization of property-owners”
who claimed protection from the public for the unhindered expansion of
their wealth (1958, 68). This statement seems to impute an idiotic outlook
to the groups and classes who promoted and beneﬁted from the exploi-
tation of labor, expansion of trade, and capital accumulation. Pincus convinc-
ingly argues that the champions of the new commercial order in England ex-
plicitly directed their attention to the political question of the purpose of the
commonwealth, even when they resorted to the non-Republican language of
political economy in doing so (1998).
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powerful words, a “historical invasion and restructuring
of the non-European world [that has] dispossessed non-
Europeans of political and legal control over their resources
and economies, and modiﬁed, subordinated, or replaced their
forms of organization with the institutional preconditions of
western legal and political domination, economic exploita-
tion, and military control” (2009, 14).
Yet the history of this destruction is checkered with mul-
tiple instances of resistance to expropriation and its ten-
dency to reduce people to mere embodiments of labor power
(or in Arendtian terms, animal laborans) subject to the im-
peratives of capital accumulation. The English Enclosures
that gave rise to the English working class also triggered anti-
enclosure riots throughout the sixteenth century that then
laid the foundations for seventeenth-century radical politics
of the Diggers and Levellers who espoused a resoundingly
democratic and egalitarian political and economic vision
against England’s nascent commercial elite (Hill 1972). But
perhaps a more illuminating episode of resistance against
expropriation that matches the global scope of this process
is the story of the polyglot, multiethnic Atlantic proletariat
whose travails Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker recount
in their The Many-Headed Hydra (2000). Adopting the “orig-
inal accumulation of capital” as their vantage point on this
history, the authors reconstruct the discontinuous eruption
of struggles waged by slaves, sailors, and commoners against
being reduced to mere “hewers of wood and drawers of
water” in the service of expanding webs of commodity and
capital that harnessed the two sides of the Atlantic. Line-
baugh’s and Rediker’s chronicle of slave revolts in sugar plan-
tations, mutinies in deep-sea vessels, anti-enclosure riots, and
Leveller politics is rife with conscious, vocal, and articulate
attempts at defending existing forms of “commoning” and
inventing new ones in the face of the new vectors of expro-
priation and domination advanced by the enclosing land-
lords, merchants, slave traders, chartered companies, planto-
cracies, and the ascendant ﬁscal-military state.
The most important dimension of these struggles was
that they strove for more than simply higher wages and
better working conditions, or in Arendt’s terms, the pursuit
of “social interests” with which she indicts the modern
labor movement (1958, 215–17). Their claims were em-
phatically political in the sense of envisioning and, under
favorable circumstances, establishing egalitarian and dem-
ocratic communities, often with ﬂeeting success, as on pirate
ships, in maroon communities of runaway slaves, transported
convicts, and free laborers. Even when they were vanquished
or thwarted, the aspirations of constructing alternative forms
of self-government that pulsated in such attempts were never
entirely extinguished. They traveled around the Atlantic, in-
spiring other struggles. This is to suggest that the revolu-
tionary tradition, whose “lost treasure” Arendt laments at the
end of On Revolution, not only extends back to the prole-
tarian struggles of the early-modern period but, more im-
portantly, it is directed precisely against expropriation, dis-
placement, and the worldlessness with which it threatens
human communities.38 The remarkable vitality and frequency
of the resistance against expropriation, especially if one con-
siders the scale and signiﬁcance of the Haitian Revolution,
ﬂies in the face of Arendt’s claim that the incapacity of ani-
mal laborans for political action is evidenced in the “striking
absence of serious slave rebellions in ancient and modern
times” (1958, 215).39
To appreciate the political valence of these struggles
against expropriation, however, one has to ﬁrst extend one’s
view beyond Western Europe and America and, second,
construe expropriation as a terrain of contestation with po-
litical stakes, rather than as an “unmediated, quasi-natural
process” that spontaneously “happens” to people under the
onslaught of “the social.” Once these adjustments are ad-
mitted, recentering on expropriation as primitive accu-
mulation can help us unravel the ambiguity of “labor” in
Arendt’s theory as at once a supremely “anti-political” ac-
tivity (1958, 213) and a “public political fact of the ﬁrst
order” and the “political side” of the perplexities of mo-
dernity (2002, 280, 284).40 For what is at stake in primitive
accumulation is nothing less than the speciﬁc articulation
of the laboring activity to the overall organization of col-
lective life, in Klein’s words, the “worldly, stabilizing me-
diations” that place social reproduction “beyond the reach of
38. A similar conclusion can be derived from Pyotr Kropotkin’s
([1902] 2006) survey of traditions of spontaneous self-organization and
self-management of village communities in Eurasia in Mutual Aid. The
complex structures of common property, cooperation, and “folkmotes”
(assemblies of collective decision making) in Kropotkin’s study bear more
than just imagistic resemblance to Arendt’s cherished council system that
ﬂourishes during revolutionary periods. In both cases, the centralized, ad-
ministrative state behaves as the nemesis of such forms of self-organization
that elude its orbit. In Kropotkin’s narrative, we ﬁnd the village commu-
nity as a bulwark against the state’s attempts to dismantle common forms
of property and labor and with them the institutional backbone of self-
government. Translated into Arendtian terms, resistance against state-led
expropriation, commercialization, and proletarianization is tantamount to
resistance against the encroachment of the social.
39. It should be noted that Marx himself was as uninterested in
struggles against expropriation as Arendt was oblivious to them, as the
world-historical mission of primitive accumulation to universalize capital-
ism consigned such resistances to theoretical and historical insigniﬁcance.
40. By contrast, Eli Zaretsky (1997, 222) ﬁnds nothing new in Arendt’s
conceptualization of the modern activity of laboring but a continuation of the
Western tradition of degrading work and exalting idealism tied to the idea of
leisure. The valorization of public activity in ancient Greece and private activ-
ity in modern societies simply express the same asymmetry.
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the market forces and instrumental economic imperatives”
(2014, 866). Even if we admit Arendt’s conception of “labor”
as an inescapable human activity, its articulation can assume
multiple, contending forms, among which capitalist moder-
nity has emerged as the historically triumphant but by no
means the predestined system. Construing expropriation as
a principal site of contestation over different modalities of
articulating labor, wherein alternatives to the “social” or cap-
italist variant of this articulation are at stake, shines light on
expropriation’s political, as opposed to economic, dimension.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD POLITICIZING
THE ECONOMY
Perhaps the boldest conjecture that can be made based on
the foregoing analysis is that “the social” is not so much a
domain or even an outlook as distinct from “the political.”
Rather, insofar as the “social” signiﬁes the constellation of
discourses and strategies for securing the conditions of
capital accumulation by governing human populations
through biopolitical and sovereign technologies of power,
it can be understood as the outcome of political struggles,
dating back to the early-modern period, over competing
value systems and visions of organizing collective life. That
these struggles have been largely resolved in favor of the
“emancipation of labor” (i.e., the forcible reduction of the
human body to the mere embodiment of labor power) does
not invalidate the political features of such struggles or their
ongoing presence. A productive approach to the social would
therefore be neither to abandon it on the grounds of its con-
ceptual inconsistency, nor to accept it in Arendt’s own terms
as an essentially economic sphere of production, circulation,
and consumption entrusted to public administration. In-
stead, the social is itself a stake in political contestation and
a theoretical problematic in which one ﬁnds politics and
economics, expropriation and exploitation, power and vio-
lence, and authority and ideology entwined. A serious and
critical engagement with these aspects of the social neces-
sarily expands the range of questions that circumscribe the
vocation of political theory and urges it to take up questions
conventionally relegated to the ﬁeld of economics or politi-
cal economy.
It might be objected that my political interpretation of
expropriation remains ultimately an external critique that
has little in common with Arendt’s conception of the po-
litical based on speech, judgment, deliberation, and non-
violent action (McGowan 1997b). Such rebuttal, however,
does not resolve the theoretical difﬁculty posed by the pe-
culiarity of expropriation, which cannot be theorized as an
“economic” category without a political remainder. Expro-
priation clearly does not belong to the private economy of
the household (oikonomia) and the mastery of material ne-
cessity. Neither can it be comprehended as part of the pub-
lic economy of the nation (“the social”), for expropriation
as primitive accumulation is the very process that gives
rise to the public economy in the ﬁrst place, thereby eluding
theorization with reference to a preexisting “social” domain.41
Expropriation at times lacks even a legal status as, for in-
stance, when it takes the form of unlawful enclosures, settler
colonialism, imperial plunder, or in short “simple robbery,”
that belong to the global history of capital.
Critically, such acts of expropriation are driven not by
impersonal, transhistorical forces but by speciﬁc groups and
classes united by a common vision and allied for realizing it
in the world, by violent means if necessary. If successful, such
actions can radically alter the fabric of social reality by de-
stroying extant institutions of property and self-government
and imposing new structures, no less in the Scottish High-
lands after the Clearances than in Bengal after the Permanent
Settlement. That such initiatives partake of the characteris-
tics of “action” in inaugurating something new, unpredictable,
and uncontrollable does not necessarily make the reality that
they institute, such as the global network of capitalist re-
lations, more desirable. These ramiﬁcations remain out of
sight, however, if one categorically rejects “class” as a relevant
tool of analysis in politics and reduces expropriation to a
process that simply liberates the biological life process from
its conﬁnement in the household and unleashes it onto the
public sphere.
A third issue brought into focus by expropriation is the
global networks of economic interdependence, which receive
at best passing remarks from Arendt who, in Mantena’s
words, “has very little to say in terms of its [imperialism’s]
speciﬁc and catastrophic legacy for the ex-colonial world”
(2002, 104). The abovementioned dependence of settler free-
doms on colonial dispossession is a case in point. The impli-
cations go further. For instance, in an oft-quoted passage in
On Revolution, Arendt categorically denies that the social
question of poverty can be resolved by political means be-
cause, she maintains, poverty is a nonpolitical, natural con-
dition with a technical solution (1962, 63). “Human life has
been stricken with poverty since times immemorial, and man-
kind continues to labour under this curse in all countries out-
side the Western Hemisphere. No revolution has ever solved
the ‘social question’ ” (112). More important than the iron-
ically Benthamite premise behind this argument, reducing
41. This is also why classical political economy as the language for
analyzing the social as public economy fails to supply an endogenous
theory of primitive accumulation and resorts to myths to ﬁll this consti-
tutive gap.
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the question of poverty to the problem of scarcity leads Arendt
to commit the same mystiﬁcation as mid-twentieth “diffu-
sionist” modernization theories.42 The assumption is that the
nations of the Western Hemisphere have solved the problem
of poverty “not by revolution but by science and technology”
(Arendt 1972, 117), which, given the political neutrality of
technology, can enable any developing country do the same.
What is screened out is the globality of capitalism as a his-
torically speciﬁc social formation, which not only mediates
both the development and the utilization of technology but
does so through fundamentally uneven and combined pro-
cesses of accumulation across the planet. If colonial geneal-
ogies of capitalism are given any credence, their immediate
implication for the “social question” is that the “liberation of
the life process” and the resultant “abundance” in Western
Europe and its settler colonies is entwined with the history
of degradation, precarization, and truncation of the life pro-
cess in the colonies and their postcolonial heirs.43 These en-
tangled histories elude the grasp of a perspective that lumps
together everything related to “life process” and, by counter-
posing it to politics, obliterates critical distinctions within the
transnational social.
In conclusion, if one takes seriously the Marxian prov-
enance of Arendt’s notion of expropriation and explicates
its theoretical and historical valences, one cannot avoid the
challenge posed by this phenomenon to political theory. Cat-
egorically outside the private and the public economy and
punctuated by the constituent power of people forming alli-
ances and acting in concert, the process of expropriation and
resistances to it contain a political element that insinuates
itself into the historical development of a global and inter-
nally variegated society of laborers. The political stakes of
this historical development would be clear to a whole gen-
eration of young people in Europe and the United States,
who have lost not just the prospects of job security but more
broadly the chances of self-fulﬁllment in their lifetime to
neoliberal policies of austerity designed, defended, and im-
plemented by technocrats. The times call for politicizing the
economy, both in theory and praxis, opening it to delibera-
tion, contestation, and social struggle. The question of ex-
propriation can give us a good starting point for doing so.
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